mental impressions are cancelled by memory in the capacity of memory. On the other hand experience confirms that birth of each memory strengthens the mental impressions. The strength of mental impressions is to have many of them corresponding to an object. Thus the definition is flawless. However, the definition of falsity could be 'the character of being cancelled by the direct realization of the substratum. Then all the flaws shown above will have no place at all. Nor there is no flaw of being too wide, in its application to the doubt when it is cancelled by knowledge acting in its capacity of certitude (niścaya) which is universally concomitant with the character of knowledge (jñānatva vyāpya dharmena). Thus the third definition is also flawless and thereby proves the illusory nature of the world well.

1. jñātvā devam mucyate sarva pápaḥ, Śvetāsvatara Upaniṣad 1.11
2. 'jñānāgniḥ sarva karmāṇi bhasmasāt kuruterjuna' - Bhagavad Gītā 4.37.
3. 'ātmavāre draṣṭavyo mantayo nīcidhyāṣṭavyah' - Brhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad (hereafter BU) 2.4.5
5. BU.4.19
6. Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad.2.8.
7. BU.4.3.10
8. BU.3.4.2
9. BU.4.5.14
10. BU.3.4.2
11. Māndūkya Kārikā 1.18.
12. Taittiriya Upaniṣad.2.5.4
14. BU.2.3.6
16. Vārtika, 1.1.83

The bhāṣya of Śaṅkara is the means for understanding the meaning of the Vedānta sutras. The bhāṣya begins with the adhyāsabhāṣya. We shall first examine what is the purpose of the adhyāsabhāṣya and what is the relationship between the first sutra and adhyāsabhāṣya. Another matter to be considered is, what are the objections raised by other schools and what is the reply of Advaita to them.

The first sutra is — अथ अतः ब्रह्मनिर्वास

The meaning of the word atha is, after having acquired the four essential requisites, namely, discrimination between the eternal and the ephemeral, an attitude of detachment towards enjoyment of the fruits of action in this world as well as in higher worlds, perfection of disciplines such as control of the mind, control of all the senses and organs,
etc., and intense yearning for liberation\textsuperscript{1}—नित्यानित्यस्वतुस्विवः, ज्ञानार्थभोगविदम:; श्रद्धाविश्वासः अभावस्वात:—समस्तव्यत्वः।

\textbf{Brahmājijñāsā implies adhyāsa}

A person who has acquired these four requisites is the competent person (adhikāri) to take up Brahmājijñāsā. Jijñāsā means the desire to know. Desire and knowledge are not matters in respect of which there can be an injunction. They have to arise by themselves. The desire for liberation arises in a person who has acquired the four requisites mentioned earlier. Then he should do whatever is necessary for the fulfillment of this desire. A man who is hungry and wants relief from it should eat. Similarly, this sūtra says that one who desires liberation should engage in vedāntavikāra, just as a man who wants to go to heaven must perform a yajña. The knowledge of Brahmā is the means for liberation. Liberation is the removal of bondage. By the knowledge of a particular thing the ignorance about it is removed. When it is said that knowledge of Brahmā removes “bondage, it is indicated that bondage is due to ignorance of Brahmā. Bondage cannot be removed by any means other than knowledge of Brahmā. Ignorance and its effects are removed by knowledge. A real snake can be driven away by some action, but an illusory snake appearing where there is only a rope can be removed only by the knowledge of the rope. The first sūtra therefore indicates that bondage is mithyā (not real). This conclusion is arrived at by the pramāṇa known as artha-pattī. Artha-pattī is explained later on.

\textbf{The nature of bondage}

There are gradations in bondage. The main bondage is the connection of ignorance with the ātmā, in the form of superimposition. Thereafter comes the superimposition of the subtle and the gross bodies. Then follows the superimposition of external objects. In superimposition there is a substratum (adhiṣṭhāna) and the superimposed (āropya). Sāṅkara says that there is a blending of the real and the unreal\textsuperscript{2}—सत्यानुपातिः निर्युक्तम्. So in bondage one part is real (ātmā), and the other part is unreal (anātmā).

\textbf{The purpose of adhyāsabhāṣya}

Now an objection is raised. It is said that such a superimposition is impossible because the requisite conditions for the same are not present. So the claim in the first śūtra that bondage can be removed by knowledge cannot be correct. The adhyāsabhāṣya is intended to reply to this objection.

Now the question arises, what is the need for dealing with superimposition at the beginning of the bhaṣya itself? The answer is that if the objections raised are answered, then the further study of the śāstra can proceed.

This work is known as शास्त्रविज्ञानम्. śāstra means the one who is in the body, i.e. the jīva. So this śāstra deals with the jīva. But it begins with the desire to know Brahmā. This shows that the subject-matter of this śāstra is the oneness of jīva and Brahmā. But, the jīva looks upon himself as different from Brahmā. It follows that this difference is only due to ignorance. Bondage which is the result of this ignorance is therefore mithyā. Thus it is seen that two results flow from this. One is that, since bondage can be removed by knowledge, it must be mithyā. The second is that, since jīva and Brahmā are one, bondage is mithyā. The purpose of the adhyāsabhāṣya is to establish these two matters.

\textbf{Knowledge cannot destroy what is real}

Now two objections are raised: (1) Just because knowledge removes bondage, it does not follow that bondage is mithyā.

\textsuperscript{1} BSSB-MIE - Page 45 - sūtrabhāṣyam

\textsuperscript{2} BSSB-MIE - Page 12 - sūtrabhāṣyam
(2) Since the śāstra is pramāṇa, why can it not be merely accepted, and what is the need for proving that bondage is mithyā?

In support of the first objection some examples are given. It is said that a poison which has entered the body is removed by thinking of garuḍa (garudasmaranam). The thought of garuḍa is only knowledge. By this knowledge the poison, which is real, is removed. It is said that detachment can be acquired by knowing the adverse effects of sense-objects. Here also the knowledge of the adverse effects removes the desire for the sense-objects, though the desire is real. The sin of killing a Brāhmaṇa is said to be removed by the sight of Setu. The sight of Setu is only knowledge and it destroys the sin which is real. Another example is the antecedent negation of knowledge (jñānaprāgabhāva), which is removed by knowledge, though it is real.

These objections are answered as follows. The mere thought of garuḍa does not remove the poison. It should be accompanied by the chanting of the relevant mantras and the performance of prescribed rituals. Detachment is not mere removal of desire. It is the attainment of a state of mind which is opposed to desire. The sight of Setu by itself does not remove the sin. The person has to observe celibacy for twelve years, should publicly announce his guilt and repentance wherever he goes, and also perform the prescribed rituals. Antecedent negation is not a positive entity and so this example is not valid. So in all these cases mere knowledge does not destroy something that is real.

The role of arthāpatti

The second objection is that since the śāstra is pramāṇa, there is no need for proving its correctness by means of other reasons. This objection is met as follows. For attaining heaven yāga is prescribed. But the result, heaven, will come only much after the performance of the yāga. If there is to be the relationship of cause and effect between the yāga and the attainment of heaven, there should be no intervening period between the conclusion of the yāga and the attainment of heaven. To solve this difficulty Mimamsakas have postulated a result in the form of aprūva which is produced during the performance of the yāga. This aprūva continues till the life of the person who has performed the yāga comes to an end and he attains heaven. This aprūva is not mentioned in the śruti. It is postulated on the basis of the pramāṇa known as arthāpatti. When there is conflict between two pramāṇas, a conclusion has to be postulated which reconciles the conflict. For example, a person named Devadatta is known to be alive, but he is not found in his house. Both these are pramāṇas and they are in conflict. So it has to be concluded that he is elsewhere. This reconciles the conflict. This is arthāpatti. Another example is - Devadatta does not eat during the day, but he continues to be fat. Here also there is conflict between two pramāṇas. This is resolved by the conclusion that he must be eating at night. Similarly, the śruti which is pramāṇa, says that yāga is the cause of heaven. But we see that heaven is not attained immediately on the completion of the yāga. This is also a pramāṇa. Thus there is conflict between the two pramāṇas. To resolve this conflict aprūva has been postulated by arthāpatti.

Knowledge does not need any other help to remove bondage

Śaṅkara has said repeatedly that the śāstra gives knowledge alone and cannot modify facts (सास्त्रं ज्ञानं न कारणं). The opponent now asks: In the case of nacre-silver it is true that knowledge of the nacre alone is necessary for removal of the
illusory silver. But has Vedānta proved that knowledge by itself leads to removal of bondage and that knowledge does not depend on anything else for this purpose? This question has been answered later in the bhāṣya on Brahmasūtra 3.4.25 and 3.4.26. There it has been said that for knowledge to arise karma, etc., are necessary, but once knowledge has arisen it does not need the help of anything else for removing bondage. In Bhagavadgītā also it has been said in chapter 6 that karma is necessary for a person to become yogārūḍha, but thereafter karma is not necessary, but only the pursuit of knowledge.

Some contend that even without establishing superimposition, the study of the śāstra can be proceeded with. This is rejected as untenable.

Reality is of one nature only

The following objection is raised: When you say that if bondage is real, it cannot be removed by knowledge, what is the nature of the reality that you are speaking of? Is it vyāvahārika or pāramārthaika?

The answer to this objection is that it is not correct to divide reality into two categories. Reality is only one. Only mithyā can be divided into two categories, namely vyavahārika or empirical and prātibhāsika or illusory. So the question raised is without any basis.

Superimposition is on Consciousness

The next objection is: You say that there is superimposition of avidyā on the ātmā. Is this superimposition on the paramātma or on the jīvātmā? The former is impossible, since paramātma is Pure Consciousness. To say that there is superimposition of avidyā on paramātma would be like saying that there is darkness in the sun. If you say that there is superimposition of avidyā on the jīvātmā, that is also not tenable, because according to you the jīvātmā is the same as paramātma. Moreover, jīvātmā is consciousness with the superimposition of avidyā. How can there be a superimposition of avidyā on such a jīvātmā?

The answer to this objection is: This is not a proper question at all since it goes against the theory of the Naïyāyika himself. To take an example. A man with a stick is called a danda. All men in the world can be divided into two categories, those with a stick and those without a stick. There is no other category. Who is the person for whom connection with a stick arose? Clearly not the person without a stick. If you say that connection with a stick arose for the danda, it will mean that he was a danda even before he had the stick. So the correct answer is that the connection with the stick arose for a man and not for a danda or an adanda. Similarly superimposition of avidyā is for the Pure Consciousness. Another example can be given. A man sees smoke on a mountain and infers that there is fire on the mountain. Any fire falls into one of two categories: mountain fire and non-mountain fire. Does the person who infers the existence of fire on a mountain after seeing smoke there infer that it is mountain fire or non-mountain fire? It cannot obviously be non-mountain fire. Then if he says that it is mountain fire, what is the basis for this inference? The inference is based on his experience that when there is smoke in the kitchen there is fire there. But that is non-mountain fire. On the basis of this experience how can he infer the existence of mountain fire? So it could be said that there is the defect of non-existence in the example (kitchen) of the thing to be proved (mountain fire). This is answered by saying that what is inferred is just fire without any qualification such as kitchen fire, mountain fire, etc. Similarly, what we say is that the superimposition is on consciousness as such, without any qualification.
Superimposition is the effect of avidyā

By association with avidyā, Pure Consciousness becomes three-fold, namely, Pure Consciousness, Īśvara and Jīva. According to the reflection theory (pratibimbavāda), these are Īśvara who is the bimba, jīva who is the pratibimba, and Pure Consciousness which pervades both of them. Superimposition is the effect of avidyā. This superimposition is for the reflection in avidyā (namely jīva) and not for the other two. To take an example: there is a pot with water in it. There is space within the pot, there is total space and there is the reflection of space (the sky with the sun or stars, etc) in the water. When the water in the pot moves it is only the reflection of space that moves and not the other two. So also, it is only the reflection in avidyā that is affected and not the bimba or pure consciousness.

According to the author of Prakāśārtarhavivarana3 both Īśvara and Jīva are reflections. The distinction is caused by the reflecting medium. The medium is māyā for Īśvara and avidyā for the Jīva. Māyā has an infinite number of parts and each part is an avidyā. This avidyā has two powers, veiling power and projecting power. It is called avidyā because it is destroyed by vidiyā. He follows the theory of multiple jīvas as distinguished from that of a single jīva. When a person attains Self-knowledge, the avidyā in his mind is destroyed and he becomes Pure Consciousness. Īśvara is the indwelling Self and the inner controller for all jīvas. Once a person becomes liberated, he no longer experiences bondage though the world continues to exist, just as a blind man does not experience the world through the power of vision.

In the śruti statement which says that māyā is destroyed in its entirety for the liberated person—षुधानन्ते विभमायानिवृत्ति:

— māyā means avidyā pertaining to that person alone according to Prakāśārtarhakāra. When a particular jīva attains videhamuktī, the avidyāsamāskāra in his internal organ is destroyed. In this way the parts of māyā known as avidyā get destroyed when the persons to whom those avidyās pertain attain videhamuktī. The question arises whether, in this manner, when all jīvas get videhamuktī, māyā will cease to exist. According to Prakāśārtarhakāra this cannot happen because the parts of māyā called avidyā are infinite in number and so they can never be exhausted. This view is contradictory to those of other commentators who hold that a time will come when all the jīvas are liberated and māyā ceases to exist.

Māyā does not contradict non-duality of Brahman

The next question is, if māyā is never destroyed, will not the theory of non-duality of Brahman be contradicted? The answer is no, because māyā is mithyā and Brahman is the only reality. Even according to Prakāśārtarhakāra māyā and avidyā are not different because avidyā is only a part of māyā, just as the pot-space is not different from the total space.

Objections to the theory of superimposition of ātmā and anātmā

The next objection is: adhyāsa can occur only if the substratum is not known. Superimposition of silver can take place only if the nacre is not known. The ātmā is known to every one as 'I'. The difference between the self and the not-self, namely, body, mind and sense organs, is known to all because no one says 'I am the body'. Moreover, only another substance can be superimposed on a substance. The illusion is in the form of 'This is silver' and not as 'I am silver'. The seen cannot be superimposed on the seer, or vice versa. The ātmā being the seer, nothing can be superimposed on it.
Moreover, there has to be some similarity between the substratum and the superimposed object. One mistakes nacre for silver because they are similar in that they are both bright. No one mistakes nacre for an elephant. Ātma and anatma are totally contradictory like light and darkness — युक्तस्मात्मात्माविविधतावथा: विविधविविधतावथा: तम:प्रकाशविविधतावथा:। इत्येऽत्मानन्दुपपति: सिद्धाय तद्वित्याकारी सुन्दर इत्येऽतमानन्दुपपति:।

For all these reasons superimposition of the self on the not-self or vice versa is not possible. When a person says ‘I am a man’, etc, it is only in a secondary sense (gaṇa), like saying ‘This boy is a lion’.

Even though, for the reasons stated above there cannot be superimposition between the self and the not self as such —धर्माध्याय:। let us consider whether superimposition of the qualities of the one on the other is possible—धर्मोध्याय:, like the superimposition of the red colour of a flower on a crystal. This is also not possible. Even in the case of the crystal there is dharmi-adyāṣa also, because there is superimposition of the reflection of the flower on the crystal. Dharma-adyāṣa is not possible without dharmi-adyāṣa.

**Knowledge of difference does not prevent superimposition**

Every one is aware of the difference between nacre and silver, still superimposition of silver on nacre does occur. Though the difference between ‘man’ and ‘I’ is known, every one says, ‘I am a man’, though no one says, ‘I am the body’. So knowledge of difference does not prevent superimposition.

**The other objections to superimposition answered**

According to the Advaita theory of anirvacanīya there is ज्ञानविद्या or superimposition of knowledge, and also अर्थविद्या, superimposition of the object. In the superimposition of

silver on nacre, one gets the knowledge, ‘This is silver’. This is jñānadvhyasa. Knowledge is not possible without an object. So Advaita says that there is actually silver in front. This is supported by the fact that the person goes forward to grab the silver. In the same way, the world which is superimposed on the ātma (Brahman) is accepted as existing, though it has no absolute reality. The first portion of the first sentence in adhyāṣabhāṣya — युक्तस्मात्मात्माविविधतावथा: विविधविविधतावथा: तम:प्रकाशविविधतावथा:। इत्येऽत्मानन्दुपपति: सिद्धाय तद्वित्याकारी सुन्दर इत्येऽतमानन्दुपपति:।

refers to jñānadvhyasa. The second portion—इति:। अरमयत्वन्धृभोक्ते विशिष्यो चिदालस्य युक्तस्मात्मात्माविविधतावथा: विविधविविधतावथा:। इत्येऽत्मानन्दुपपति: सिद्धाय तद्वित्याकारी सुन्दर इत्येऽतमानन्दुपपति:।

refers to arthādvhyāsa.

It has been established that the reasons given by the opponent for rejecting superimposition are not valid. Every one looks upon his body as himself. The body has birth and death and so the self is also thought to have birth and death. Similarly the qualities of the self are attributed to the body and so the body is very dear, though this is actually a quality of the self. This superimposition is a fact experienced by every one and so it cannot be denied. This identification of the self with the body cannot be considered to be merely secondary (gaṇa) on the ground that every one knows that he is different from the body because no one says, ‘I am the body’. Though the difference between nacre and silver is known to every one, still nacre is sometimes mistaken for silver. This is because lack of discrimination at the relevant time. It is therefore said in the bhāṣya that because of lack of discrimination between the self and the not-self — इत्येऽत्मानन्दुपपति: सिद्धाय तद्वित्याकारी सुन्दर इत्येऽतमानन्दुपपति:।

and this is the reason for the wrong identification. Moreover, though 'I' and
'man' are different, no man says, 'I am not a man'. So there is no realization of the difference between 'I' and 'man'. The same is the case when one says, 'I am the doer'. Thus, though the difference is known, there is lack of discrimination between the self and the body and this is the reason for the identification of the two.

The contention of the opponent that both the substratum and the superimposed entity should be substances is not tenable because it is well known from everyday experience that the self and the not-self are looked upon as identical by every one. Such a patent fact cannot be rejected by mere arguments.

Mithyājñāna is split up as mithyā ajñāna, i.e. ignorance which is mithyā, that is, it cannot be described as either real or unreal. This is the reason for the wrong identification. By using the word nimitta after mithyājñāna in the bhāṣya it is pointed out that ignorance is the material cause (upādānakāraṇam) of the superimposition. In Vēdāntic terminology, the word nimitta is used to denote the efficient cause and the word upādāna denotes the material cause. But in grammar and also in worldly usage nimitta is used to denote material cause also. In Nyāya several kinds of causes such as samavāyi, asamavāyi, nimitta, are mentioned, but in Vēdānta only two causes, nimitta and upādāna, are accepted. For any effect to be produced a material cause is necessary. Illusion (bhramā), being an effect, must have a material cause. In this sentence in the bhāṣya there is no other word to denote the material cause and so the word nimitta has been interpreted by Prākāṭārthakāra as material cause. The word itaretara- avivekena, meaning, due to non-discrimination between the self and the not-self, has been interpreted as denoting the efficient cause.

Brahman is the cause through vivarta and nescience through parināma

Brahman is both the efficient and the material cause of the universe, but it is the material cause only through vivarta or transfiguration and not parināma or transformation. Ajñāna is the material cause of the universe by transformation (parināmyupādānakāraṇa). Ajñāna is a defect (doṣa) and so the word nimitta implies that ajñāna is the efficient cause also.

Can the word mithyājñāna be split up as mithyā jñāna also? The answer is no, because the word would then mean adhyāsa itself, but not the cause of adhyāsa.

The question as to whether there is any pramāṇa for ajñāna cannot arise at all. The question itself means that the questioner has ignorance. Moreover, when a person wakes up from deep sleep he says that he slept happily and did not know anything. This clearly shows that there was ignorance during sleep.

The expression7 सत्त्वकृतेऽर्थियकृतेऽ—combining the real and the unreal—brings out the Advaita theory of अविश्वविद्यविद्याति.

Theories of error (khyātivāda)

There are five well-known theories of khyāti or erroneous cognition, held by the different dāśānāms. These theories are described briefly below.

1. Ātmakhyāti8 - is the theory of one school of Buddhism known as Yogācāra. They deny the existence of external objects and hold that it is only internal cognitions that are externalized as objects. According to this theory the illusory object, say, silver, as well as the substratum, nacre, are both non-existent and are only internal ideas. The error consists

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6 BSSB-MIE - Page 12- Prakāṭārthavivaraṇam
7 BSSB-MIE - Page 12- सत्त्वकृतेऽर्थियकृतेऽ
8 These theories of error are also covered later on when defining adhyāsa.
in their being perceived as external objects. Just as the nacre is only a form of inner consciousness, so is the illusory silver. Advaita Vedānta rejects this theory. One of the grounds for rejection is that if the substratum, nacre, and the illusory silver are only forms of inner consciousness, then there cannot be any distinction between valid and erroneous perception.

2. Asatkyāṭi - This is the theory of the Nihilist school of Buddhism, known as the Mādhyamika school. It says that in illusory perception something non-existent is apprehended as existent. Both the substratum, nacre and the illusory silver are non-existent. This view is rejected by all the Vedic schools, because there cannot be any cognition of what does not exist. The son of a barren woman cannot be seen either in reality or in illusion.

3. Akhyāṭi - This is the theory of the Prabhakara school of Mimāṃsā. The view held by this school is that there is no positive error in illusory perception; instead, there is only lack of discrimination between the object perceived (nacre) and the object remembered (silver). The nacre is perceived in a general way as ‘this’ and not as possessing the distinctive feature of nacreness. Silver, which was seen elsewhere, is recollected, but without its association with the past time when, and the particular place where, it was seen. Such recollection is described as recollection of an object robbed of its ‘thatness’. In certain other cases, such as ‘the conch is yellow’, this school explains that two imperfect perceptions arise, one being the visual perception of a conch as such, its real colour (white) being missed” and the other being the visual perception of the yellow colour of the bilious matter which causes jaundice, the relation of the yellow colour to the bilious substance being missed. Thus in all cases of erroneous cognition two distinct cognitions, either a

perception and a recollection or two perceptions, arise, but their distinction is missed.

4. Anyataḥakhyāṭi - This is the theory of the Naiyāyikas. When nacre is wrongly perceived as silver, the erroneous cognition that arises takes the form ‘this is silver’. Here ‘this’ stands for nacre lying in front of the perceiver, and it is first seen as a white piece and not as nacre, the distinctive feature of nacre-ness being missed either through some defect in sight or because of the particular situation in which the visual perception arises. The visual perception of nacre as ‘this’ arises in the ordinary way, by contact of the visual organ with the object in front. The real silver-ness that belongs to the real silver existing elsewhere is presented in this visual perception as the attribute of the nacre seen as ‘this’ in a general way; neither the real silver nor the real silver-ness could be said to be connected with the sense of sight through normal sense-relation; and without such sense-relation being established between the sense-organ concerned and the object to be perceived, perception cannot arise. So the Naiyāyikas hold that the real silver and silver-ness come to be connected with the sense of sight through an extra-normal type of sense-relation. Thus according to the Naiyāyikas, the visual misapprehension of nacre as silver is an extra-normal variety of visual perception.

5. Anirvacaniyakhyāṭi - This is the theory of the Advaitins. According to this the silver seen on nacre cannot be categorized as either real or unreal. The person seeing it thinks that there is real silver before him and that is why he stretches out his hand to grab the silver. Similarly, the universe which is an appearance on Brahman is neither real nor unreal. As in the case of silver, the universe is looked upon by all as real until Brahman is realized. As a result of this superimposition every one says ‘I am a man’, etc., and ‘This is mine’. Thus there are two kinds of adhyāsa.
This superimposition is described as नैसर्गिक which means beginningless. So far the interpretation of Prakāśārthakāra has been given. In his view the objections raised are answered by the three expressions9 इत्यदेभिन्नतेन, लक्षणनिवेदयध, नैसर्गिक.

Vivarana10 and Ratnaprabha11 consider the objection that there can be superimposition of a particular object such as silver only if the person has previously seen real silver somewhere. He must have knowledge of the superimposed object as a reality. This is not possible in the case of the superimposition of the non-self because the non-self is not real and so he could not have experienced it as real previously. This objection is answered by the word ‘naisargika’ which means that the adhyāśa is beginningless and in each adhyāśa the experience of a previous adhyāśa is there. Moreover, it is not necessary that he should have knowledge of the real object. Even a person who has seen a snake only in a picture can mistake a rope for a snake.

According to Bhāmati12, the expression itaretara-anivekena answers the objection. The objection considered is that everyone is aware that the body is different from the self and so superimposition of the body on the self is not possible. The answer is that though the difference is known, there is still lack of discrimination between the two to the extent necessary and so adhyāśa is possible.

**Definition, possibility and proof of adhyāśa**

In the first part of adhyāśabhasya the lakṣaṇa or definition of adhyāśa is given. The adhyāśas such as that of silver on

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9 BSSB-MIE - Prakāśārthavivaranaam Pages 10-13.
10 PP-MIE - Pages 49-50-vivaranaam तत्त्व श्रव्यतः तत्त्वम, अवश्य प्रभाव-जननम्- उपदान-कारकम् नैसर्गिकम्.
11 BSSB-MBDE-Page 10-Ratnaprabha प्रत्ययमाने हेतुनवाशिकरणेष्व अवश्यप्रभावः. अनवर्तः हस्तम्.
12 BSSB-MBDE-Page 9-Bhāmati हृदस्यशिविनेष्विन विशालप्राप्ते हस्तम्.
inference, comparison, etc. An experience gives rise to a samskāra. This samskāra is the cause of remembrance. The point of similarity between adhyāsa and remembrance is that both are produced by samskāra. The difference is that, for adhyāsa there should be some defect as one of the causes, but not for remembrance. Contact of the eye with an object is necessary for adhyāsa, but not for remembrance. For adhyāsa of silver on nacre there should be contact of the eye with the object in front, the knowledge that there is an object in front, but not the knowledge of the nacre-ness of the object. If it is pitch dark the object itself will not be seen and then there can be no adhyāsa. So some defect (doṣa), because of which the nacre-ness of the object in front is not known, is necessary for adhyāsa of silver to take place. This definition of adhyāsa brings out both the tātasthālakṣaṇa and the svarūpālakṣaṇa of adhyāsa. The word smṛitraupe. I denotes the tātasthālakṣaṇa and the words paratra avabhāsāh. I denote the svarūpālakṣaṇa. What has been said so far is the well known definition of adhyāsa.

Prakāśṭhakāra13 gives a different commentary. He takes all the four words together and says all of them together describe the lakṣaṇa of adhyāsa. The word pūrvadrśta-avabhāsāh, by itself can refer to mere remembrance also and so there is the defect of over-applicability of the definition if this word alone is used. To avoid this, the word smṛitraupe. has been added. This indicates that it is like remembrance but it is not remembrance itself. If we say only pūrvadrśta-avabhāsāh - the appearance of what was seen before - it could apply to recognition also. Recognition requires previous perception of the particular object, together with the samskāra generated by the previous perception. But recognition is not adhyāsa. So the definition has to be supplemented by some word which will exclude recognition. The word paratra- elsewhere- has been added for this purpose. This shows that what is seen in adhyāsa is a thing different from what was seen before. The silver seen is not the same as the real silver seen elsewhere.

A person sees a cow at a particular time and place. Later on he sees an animal resembling a cow, but not another cow. This is not adhyāsa. To prevent this being taken as adhyāsa the word pūrvadrśtaḥ has been introduced. So what is seen in adhyāsa must be what was seen earlier and not something similar to it. When nacre is seen as silver, what is seen is silver and not some other substance which resembles silver. Thus the adhyāsa is caused by the samskāra of the previous perception of silver. The silver seen in the adhyāsa is however mithyā and not the real silver seen earlier. It is different from what was seen earlier, but it is thought to be the same.

Bhāmāti view14: Avabhāsāh. It means knowledge which is discarded later on when found to be wrong.

What has been said above applies equally to jñānādhyāsa (superimposition of cognition) and to arthādhyāsa (superimposition of object). In nacre-silver illusion there is the cognitum ‘This is silver’. This is jñānādhyāsa. The person says ‘There is silver here’. That is, he sees silver as actually existing before him. The object, silver, is thus actually present according to him. This is arthādhyāsa, i.e. the object, silver, appears there. The word smṛti: can be split up as smaraye iti smṛti:, in which case it applies to the object and consequently to arthādhyāsa. It can also be split up as smarāṇam iti smṛti: in which case it applies to the cognition of silver and therefore to jñānādhyāsa.

13 BSSB-MIE- Pages 14-15- Prakāśṭhavivṛta
14 BSSB-MBDE- Page 11- Bhāmāti असाध्यभासा की अपवाहा
Defect, contact of the eye with the object, and samskāra—these three are the nimittakārana, efficient cause, of adhyāsa. Ignorance of the nacre is the defect.

Thus the lakṣya (definition) of adhyāsa has been given. The lakṣya (what is intended to be defined) is-अत्मिष्ठं तदुपविभिः: seeing a thing where it is not.

The purpose of lakṣya is to distinguish a particular thing from other things. For example, a person sees a cow before him. He can know that it is a cow only if he knows the lakṣya of a cow. If he does not know, he will see it only as some animal. The lakṣya for the moon is ‘That which is most resplendent is the moon’. Only a person who knows this definition can identify the moon in the sky. This is the svartipalakṣaṇa. The pramāṇa (valid means of knowledge such as the eye) is necessary, but it is not sufficient to identify any object. In addition, knowledge of the definition (lakṣya) of the object is also necessary.

The different dārsanās give different definitions for adhyāsa. These are known as khyāti. Five of these are well known. These have been described earlier. In the bhāṣya three of these are referred to.

The first definition referred to in the bhāṣya is, 

\[ \text{तं कैचित्त अव्यय अन्यत्मस्वर्ण: इत्य वदन्ति} \]

"Some say that it consists in the superimposition of the attributes of one thing on another". This is the definition according to ātmakhyāti of the Yogācāra school of Buddhism as well as according to anyathākhyāti of the Naiyāyikās. Both these theories have been described earlier.

The second definition referred to in the bhāṣya is, 

\[ \text{कैचित तु यत्र यद्यथास: नाहिन्द्रार्थनिष्णो व्रम इति} \]

"But others assert that wherever a superimposition on anything occurs, there is in evidence only a confusion arising from the absence of discrimination between them". This is akhyāti which is the theory of the Prabhākara school of Pūrva-māmsā. This has also been dealt with earlier.

Śaṅkara points out that, in addition to perception and remembrance there should be another knowledge of the form ‘This is silver’ and this is illusion (bhramā). So akhyātivāda is not valid.

According to the Tattvātivada commentary on Vivaraṇa this definition is that of Sāṅkhya. This is based on the view that Śaṅkara must have referred to the Sāṅkhya view because he considers the Sāṅkhyaśāstra to be the principal opponents of Advaita.

The third definition is—अन्ये तु यत्र यद्यथास: तस्येव विपरीतमत्तुलक्यानां आचार्यां इति—

"Others say that the superimposition of anything on any other substratum consists in attributing some contradictory qualities to that very substratum". This is the theory of asatkhyāti held by the Mādhyamika school of Buddhism. It says that in illusory perception something non-existent is apprehended as existent. Both the substratum, nacre and the illusory silver are non-existent. This view is rejected by all the Vedic schools, because there cannot be any cognition of what does not exist.

However, according to Brahmāvidyābhāharana this is the definition of Advaita itself.

\[ 17 \text{ BSSB - MIE - Pages 16-17 - sūtrabhāṣyaṃ} \]
\[ 18 \text{ BSSB - MSESE - Page 65 - Brahmāvidyābhārana} \]
After referring to these three definitions, Śaṅkara points out that according to all schools, "there is no difference of opinion on the point that in adhyāśa one thing appears as something else"\textsuperscript{19} — सत्याविस तु अन्याय अन्यायांं वालाय न व्यविचारति.

Thus this is a feature of adhyāśa which is accepted by all. Such a definition is therefore comprehensive and cannot be disputed by anyone.

All schools of philosophy accept adhyāśa. The difference is only in the method of explaining how it happens. There are five main theories in this respect, as described earlier. The theory of Advaita vedānta is anirvacaniya-khyati. In the bhāṣya two examples of adhyāśa are given\textsuperscript{20} — श्रुतिकाम हि रजतवद्वशस्त्रो एकाक्षरः साधीत्यवत् —

A piece of nacre appears as silver, and one moon appears as many. The nacre appearing as silver is called nirupādhika-adhyāśa, i.e. superimposition without an upādhi or limiting adjunct. This is the kind of adhyāśa because of which one says, ‘I am a man’. In this adhyāśa the self is identified with the human body. The moon appearing as many due to reflections in many pots of water is called sopādhika-adhyāśa, superimposition with a limiting adjunct. Here the limiting adjunct is the medium of reflection, namely the water. This is the kind of adhyāśa by which the one nondual pure consciousness appears as innumerable jivas, because of being reflected in innumerable subtle bodies. Adhyāśa creates differences such as Īśvara and jivas in the one and only pure consciousness. The suffix ‘vat’ added to ‘raja’ in the bhāṣya indicates that the silver is anirvacaniya, i.e. it cannot be categorized as either real or unreal. This indescribability has necessarily to be accepted.

\textsuperscript{19} BSSB - MIE - Pages 16-17 - sūtrabhāṣya
\textsuperscript{20} BSSB - MIE - Pages 16-17 - sūtrabhāṣya

Dikṣīta gives an example in his work Parimala\textsuperscript{21}. We see a man coming towards us from a distance. We say, ‘This man looks like Devadatta’. Here the word ‘like’ does not indicate similarity, but doubt as to whether the man is Devadatta or not. In ‘rajahata’ also, the suffix ‘vat’ added to ‘raja’ does not mean that what is seen is like silver. It indicates the indescribability of the silver seen. By the use of the suffix ‘vat’, Śaṅkara rejects all the other theories about adhyāśa.

Is the silver real or false? If it is real, is the silver actually present in front, or is the silver existing somewhere else? We cannot say that the silver is present here because when we go near and examine we find that there is no silver. If it is silver existing somewhere else (as held by the theory of anyathākhyāti), it cannot be seen because there is no contact between the eye and the silver. If the opponent says, that it can be seen even without eye-contact it will mean that anything anywhere can be seen by us, which is absurd. If the opponent says that the silver is seen due to some defect (and not by the eye), it will mean that it can be seen even when the eyes are closed. If the opponent says that the eyes have to be kept open to see the nacre, and if by keeping the eyes open one can see even an object far away, then it is not a defect but a blessing. Defect is what prevents the thing on which it operates from performing its function. If there is some defect in the eyes, nothing will be seen. The defect cannot make him see what cannot be seen with good eyes. So silver which is elsewhere cannot be seen.

Seeing in the case of the moon double is not due to a defect. What the defect does is to prevent the person from seeing that there is only one object. The reason for seeing

\textsuperscript{21} BSSB - CSSE - Page 34 - Parimalam

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\footnotesize{\textindent यथा साधवाच्यता वक्तव्य स्तोत्रं दृश्यं, अग्निन्द्र, दैत्यवत्स, भाविता हरानवंगादार, निर्जनकामिनि संयमक्षण तद्द्वीपाधिधिन अज्ञाता:।}
double is ajñāna or ignorance according to Advaita. So it is anirvācya. Defect is the reason for not seeing the moon as only one, and ajñāna is the reason for seeing the moon as two. Because of defect the nacre is not seen as nacre, and because of ignorance it is seen as silver. The defect may be in the object, or in the person seeing it, or in the conditions prevailing at the time. The Nihilist Buddhist says that the objects seen are non-existent. This cannot be, because what is non-existent cannot become an object of perception. So the silver is neither real nor unreal.

Now an objection is raised: how can a thing be both real and unreal, or different from real as well as different from unreal? The answer is given by taking an example. An animal cannot be both a cow and a buffalo. But it can be different from both cow and buffalo. It can be a horse. Similarly, a thing can be different from both real and unreal.

Vivarana\(^\text{22}\) says there is no scope for any such question because the silver is anirvacaniyam.

Another objection is: The man who thinks it is silver goes forward to grab it. That means that he thinks it is real silver. So it cannot be anirvacaniyam. It must be real silver, existing elsewhere. Or, he may not know that it is anirvacaniyam and may think it is real silver. That is why he tries to grab it.

The answer to this is: The desire to grab the silver arises because he sees it as real silver. He need not know for certain that it is real silver. Otherwise even if the silver is real he will not proceed to take hold of it because he cannot be sure beforehand that it is real. He will be able to know whether it is real or not only if he goes forward and takes it in his hand and examines it. If the opponent says that he will proceed to take the silver only after knowing definitely that it is real, there will be the defect of mutual dependence because only after he knows that it is real he will try to take it and only after taking it he will know for certain whether it is real or not. So we must say that the knowledge that it is silver is sufficient to make him proceed to take it, and knowledge that it is real silver is not necessary. So merely because he desires it and attempts to take hold of it, it cannot be said that he has known it as real silver. But if he already knows that it is false, he will not make any attempt to take it. From all this it follows that the silver cannot be described as either real or unreal.

The next objection is: The knowledge of any object comes only through a pramāṇa. So when silver is seen in an illusion it is wrong to conclude that there is silver in front. But you,Advaitin, assert that there is silver by merely seeing silver in an illusion. What is the pramāṇa for this assertion?

The answer to this is: A cognition cannot arise unless there is an object. (Only the Viśṇuavādi school of Buddhism says that there are no external objects and that only an inner idea appears as an external object). The silver alone is sublated subsequently and not the cognition of silver. The cognition is therefore real and so there must be an object for this cognition. This object cannot therefore be called non-existent. Nor can we call it real because it is sublated subsequently. So it is anirvacaniyam.

Next objection: You (Advaitin) say that the universe is mithyā. So how can there be the distinction of correct knowledge and illusion in the world?

The answer is: The silver seen in an illusion is sublated later, but the real silver is not sublated during the whole lifetime of the person. Though the silver seen in an illusion...
and the real silver are both mithyā, there is a difference in the manner of the rise of the knowledge of its illusoriness. If the person who sees the nacre-silver does not realize its illusoriness throughout his life, he will continue to believe that it is real. So the test to know whether a thing is real or mithyā is whether the sublating knowledge has arisen or not. There is another difference between illusory silver and real silver. Bhramā is caused by ignorance. Though real silver is also mithyā, the cause of its appearance is ignorance of Brahman and the substratum (adhiṣṭhāna) is Brahman itself. For the illusory silver appearing on nacre the cause is ignorance of Brahman limited by nacre and the substratum is Brahman limited by nacre. In both cases the bhramā will cease only when the particular substratum is known.

So from the empirical standpoint we describe a thing as real when it has the unconditioned Brahman as its substratum and we describe a thing as illusory when it has Brahman limited by some object (such as nacre in the case of silver) as its substratum. Thus there are three levels of reality, pāramārthika (absolute), vyāvahārika (empirical) and prātibhāsika (illusory).

Now the opponent raises an objection: If you say that the silver was there during the period when the illusion lasted, then how can it be said that it was never there during all the three periods of time? If, for example, there is a book on the table now, and it is removed subsequently, it cannot be said that it was never there in all the three periods of time.

Answer: The silver is not there, as real silver in all the three periods of time. It is never vyāvahārika (empirically real) silver.

Opponent: You did not see real silver. You saw only illusory silver. So what you should say is that illusory silver is not there in all the periods of time. But what you are denying is the existence of real silver. That means that you saw one thing and you are denying the existence of another thing.

Answer: If there is a book on the table there is the relationship of contact between the book and the table, but there is no relationship such as samavāya (inherence) between the book and the table. So even when there is a relationship of one kind, there can at the same time be absence of relationship of another kind. Only a relationship of the same kind cannot be asserted and denied at the same time, and not relationships of two different kinds. Similarly here there is absence of real silver at the same time as there is presence of illusory (or false) silver.

Question: A person who has seen the illusory silver says subsequently, on knowing that there is only nacre, that there was no silver at all there. Nobody says that silver was there and has gone subsequently. So it cannot be said that he experienced indescribable (anirvācya) silver earlier.

Answer: Sublation is of two kinds: (1) Both the silver and its cause, ignorance, are removed, (2) The silver is known to be false, but the ignorance has not gone. The second kind of sublation occurs when a reliable person comes and says that there is no silver there. In this case the ignorance which made the silver appear is not removed, but the silver is known to be false. However, the object in front continues to look like silver, but the person believes the word of the reliable person that it is not silver. The first kind of sublation happens when the person who saw the silver realizes that the object in front is only nacre. In this case the ignorance of nacre, which was the cause of the appearance of silver, is also destroyed. In such a sublation he cannot at all think that there was silver previously.
The knowledge of the substratum" nacre, destroys even
the samskāra of the illusion. So even the remembrance that
silver was seen in the illusion disappears because the cause
of such remembrance, namely, the samskāra, is no longer
there. But he will remember that he had such an illusion,
though he will not remember that he saw silver there. The
samskāra for remembering 'I saw silver', and the samskāra
for remembering 'I had an illusion that I saw silver', are
different. While the former samskāra is destroyed by the
knowledge of the substratum, the latter is not destroyed. So
there is only remembrance of the knowledge of the illusion
and not remembrance of silver. Remembrance of an object
and remembrance of knowledge are different. So he cannot
remember the silver, but he can remember the knowledge
of the illusion. There can therefore be no valid objection to
the statement that there was silver.

The suffix 'vat' indicates that the silver was indescribable
as real or unreal and that it was mithyā.

There are four pramāṇas for this indescribability, namely,
pratyakṣa, anumāna, arthāpatti, and śruti.

Pratyakṣa - From the statement 'The silver I saw was
false', it follows that false silver was there. Thus there are
two kinds of silver, real silver and false silver.

Arthāpatti - If it is said that false silver was also not seen,
then it could not have been seen as silver at all. But it was
seen. Therefore false silver was seen.

Śruti - The statement in the Veda, 'Then there was neither
real nor unreal; but there was tāmas'. This statement means
that tāmas was neither real nor unreal, but it was there. This
proves that there can be something which is not describable
as real or unreal. Therefore the silver seen is neither real
nor unreal nor both, but it is different from both real and
unreal. This has been brought out by the suffix 'vat'. Thus
indescribability is established.

Now another question is raised: The self is not an object
according to you (Advaitin). Adhyāsa can happen only on
an object such as nacre, rope, etc. When a person sees nacre
as silver he says, 'This is silver' and not 'I am silver'. It
therefore follows that there can be no adhyāsa on the self.
The self is pure knowledge itself. It cannot become an object
of knowledge.

The answer is: The self can be an object. It cannot be said
that the self cannot at all be an object, because it is the object
of the concept 'I'. In this concept there are two parts: one
is the internal organ (antahkarana), and the other is the pure
consciousness. If we leave out the internal organ what is left
is consciousness, which is the same as the self. So the self
is also an object of the concept 'I'. The pure consciousness
without an upādhi is no doubt not an object of knowledge,
but with the internal organ as the upādhi it is an object.

Opponent: You say that the self with the upādhi of the
internal organ is an object. The self gets an upādhi only
because of adhyāsa. That means that the self becomes an
object only because of adhyāsa and only if it is an object
there can be adhyāsa on it. There is thus the defect of mutual
dependence.

The answer to this is: The adhyāsa of the internal organ
on the self is beginningless. There is a continuous succession
of adhyāsas. It is like the seed and the sprout. So the defect
of mutual dependence does not come in.

Moreover, the self need not be an object for adhyāsa to
take place. Even without being an object it can be the
substratum of adhyāsa. In the adhyāsa of silver on nacre,
what is necessary for adhyāsa is that the nacre should be
cognized as 'this'. If there is no such cognition there can be
no adhyāsa. Nacre is not self-luminous and so it can be
cognized only by a mental modification (vr̥tti). The self is
self-luminous and so it does not need another cognition to
become known. The word ‘aparokṣatvā’ in the bhāṣya
means that the self is directly perceived and is self-revealing.
An object is first seen through the visual organ. That gives
the knowledge in the form, ‘There is this object’. Then the
person says, ‘I see this object’. It is only because the self
shines in every cognition that a person is able to say that
he sees the object. This proves that the self shines by itself.

Moreover, from the fact that ignorance is known, it is clear
that the self is self-luminous. Everyone knows what he does
not know. So everyone experiences his ignorance. This also
proves that the self is self-luminous.

The Prābhākara school of Pūrvamimāṃsā does not accept
the self to be self-luminous. According to it, knowledge is
self-luminous. In any cognition the self who is the knower,
the object known, and the knowledge are simultaneously
revealed. They admit that ignorance is not self-revealing. So,
since ignorance is also known, they have necessarily to admit
that the self is self-luminous.

Now a question is raised by the opponent. What is meant
by saying that the self is self-luminous? Does it mean that
the self illumines itself and others, or does it mean something
else? The Buddhists say that knowledge becomes an object
for the same knowledge. In the knowledge of pot both
knowledge and pot are objects. Objects are revealed by light
and light itself is revealed by the same light. This is not
accepted by Advaita. The viṣaya or object of knowledge and
the viṣayi, the knower, can never be the same. ‘Self-
luminous’ means that it does not need any other
consciousness to reveal it, but it is not correct to say that it
illuminates itself also. The self is always the knower and never
the object.

Earlier, when it was said that the self is not absolutely a
non-object (aviṣaya), what was meant was that it could have
objectiveness attributed to it (āropitaviṣayatva) and not that
it could be an object in the true sense.

The conclusion is that the self is necessarily self-luminous
and it need not be an object for there to be adhyāsa. Adhyāsa
of the non-self on the self is therefore possible.

The opponent raises another objection. Adhyāsa can take
place only if the thing on which there is superimposition is
in front of the person who experiences the illusion.
Superimposition can occur only on an object which is in
front. The self is the person himself and so it cannot be in
front of him. There can therefore be no adhyāsa on the self.

The answer is: There is no invariable rule that adhyāsa
can occur only on an object in front. Ākāśa (ether) is not
perceptible by the sense organs. Still blueness is
superimposed on it. The Tārkiyas says that ākāśa is the abode
of sound and so it is known only by inference. It is therefore
not perceptible as an object in front even according to the
Tārkiyas. In spite of this, it is a well known fact that blueness
is superimposed on ākāśa. Similarly adhyāsa is possible on
the self though it cannot be perceived as an object in front.
By the use of the word ‘api’ after ‘apratyakṣa’ in the bhāṣya
the Ācarya indicates that the view that ākāśa is apratyakṣa
is not accepted by Advaita. According to Advaita ākāśa is
known directly by the witness-consciousness itself.

The Bhāttas hold that ākāśa can be seen by the eye. This
is rejected by Advaita on the ground that, if ākāśa which
has no form or colour can be seen by the eye, it should also
be possible to know it by the sense of touch even though it
does not have the quality of touch.

This is countered by the argument that since one has to
open the eyes to see ākāśa, it is perceivable by the eyes.
The answer to this is that one has to open the eyes to see the blue colour and not to see ākāśa. We can see with the eyes only things which are limited in size and not what are unlimited, like ākāśa and the form of Īśvara. What we see with the eyes is not ākāśa but avakāśa or empty space. If a thing can be seen by the eye, its absence should also be seen by the eye. The rule is that the absence of a thing is known by the same sense-organ by which its presence is known. So if we say that there is no avakāśa or empty space, it means that its absence is seen by the eye. So a person has to open his eyes only to see that no object with form is there and not to see empty space. Avakāśa (empty space) is different from ākāśa (ether). An empty space disappears when an object is put there, but ākāśa remains unaffected. To know that a quality is or is not there, we have to know its abode; for example, to know smell we have to know its abode, such as a flower. So when we say that there is no sound in a particular place, we have to say that there is no sound in this particular part of ākāśa. It is not necessary that the abode should be known by the same organ by which its quality is known. Smell is known by the olfactory organ, but the flower is known by the eye. We know sound by the ear, but its abode, ākāśa, need not be known by the ear. It is known by the witness-consciousness.

All the objections raised against the possibility of superimposition of the not-self on the self have been refuted in the preceding paragraphs and superimposition has been established.

Superimposition of the not-self on the self is the cause of such notions as ‘I am a man’, ‘I am a doer and an enjoyer’, etc. The Ācārya says in the bhāṣya that the adhyāsa of this nature is called avidyā by the learned. And the determination of the nature of the reality by discrimination is called vidyā.

It is only the superimposition of the not-self on the self that is called avidyā and not other superimpositions such as that of silver on nacre, or snake on rope. It is only for getting rid of this avidyā that the sāstras have to be studied. In the Yogaśūtra avidyā is defined as looking upon the not-self as the self. So by the term ‘learned people’ those who are learned in the Yogaśūtra are meant. This sentence should not be taken as referring to mulavidyā or as saying that there is no difference between avidyā and adhyāsa. It only means that yogis refer to what we call adhyāsa as avidyā. It is called avidyā because it is destroyed by vidyā. According to Advaita, adhyāsa can be called avidyā because avidyā is the material cause of, adhyāsa, just as a pot made of clay can be called clay. Eradicating this avidyā is the main purpose of the sāstras. The word ‘prahāṇāya’ is used to show that adhyāsa should be destroyed along with its cause. Mūlavidyā does not by itself do any harm. It is adhyāsa that is the cause of all evil. It can be got rid of only by knowing the real self. The wrong identification will be removed only when the substratum, the pure self, is realized. It is only the knowledge arising from the mahāvākyas that is called vidyā. All other knowledge falls under the category of avidyā. The pure self is not at all affected by avidyā. It is not affected by the merits or defects of what is superimposed on it by avidyā.

The mutual superimposition of the self and the not-self is the basis for all activities in the world. Without this
superimposition there can be no activity. All the scriptures operate only with this superimposition as the basis. Not only the karmakāṇḍa but even the ānānākāṇḍa or Vedānta is meant only for persons with this adhyāsa. This adhyāsa is necessary for all the six valid means of knowledge (perception, inference, comparison, verbal testimony, presumption, and non-apprehension).

A doubt arises. Superimposition is wrong knowledge (bhṛānti). If that is the basis for the valid means of knowledge, how can they be accepted as valid? Even if such wrong knowledge is the basis for the worldly means of knowledge, how can the śāstra have superimposition as its basis? The object of the śāstra is to remove superimposition. So it is contradictory to say that śāstra itself operates only because of superimposition.

The answer to this is: In the world a person undertakes any action only when the desire to acquire or get rid of some thing arises in him. Such a desire arises only after he has got knowledge of the favourable or unfavourable nature of that thing. So a person has first to become a knower or pramātā. Such a knower prompts his body to act in order to fulfill his desire. The body is the instrument of the knower. The pure self cannot be a knower. To become a knower and to perform action the superimposition of the subtle and gross bodies is necessary. Knowership and action are possible only for one who has the notions of ‘I’ and ‘mine’ with regard to the sense-organs and the body. Unless he becomes a knower his sense-organs cannot function. In deep sleep he has no identification with the senses and the body and so he is not a knower. Here the term ‘senses’ includes the mind also. In deep sleep there is no identification with the mind. In the dream state there is superimposition of the mind only. In dream the vāsanās in his subtle body produce various experiences for him. But these experiences are not caused or prompted by him as a knower. So these are not the activities of the senses. He can be called a knower only when he prompts the senses and the body to action. In the waking state his consciousness is directed outwards. In dream there is superimposition of the subtle body alone. Only when the self is associated with the senses there can be action.

Prakāṭṭarthaśakara raises another question. Soldiers fight a battle but the victory or defeat is attributed to the king though the king does not participate in the fighting. Similarly why cannot the senses function without prompting by the self. The answer is that the king pays wages to the soldiers and provides other amenities to them. He thus indirectly prompts them to fight. So also, the self has to be associated with the senses in order to make the senses function.

Then another question arises. Superimposition of the senses alone is sufficient. What is the need for the superimposition of the gross body also? The answer to this is that the senses cannot function without the gross body as locus. The senses are part of the subtle body, but they have corresponding physical organs in the gross body such as the eyes, ear, nose, etc. These are called golāka. Without these the senses cannot function. When the subtle body departs from the gross body on death it is carried to other worlds by various deities. The sense-organs in the subtle body cannot then do anything because they are no longer located in the gross body. They can function only through the golākas in the gross body. A person who has no identification with the gross body cannot have such notions as ‘I am a knower, doer, enjoyer, etc’. It is only when there...
is superimposition of the gross body on the self that one can say ‘I am so and so’, etc. The self can become a knower only if there is identification with the subtle as well as the gross bodies. Without the person becoming a knower the senses cannot function. Knowledge of Brahman arises only to a person who is a pramātā, i.e., one who identifies himself with the two bodies. Not only the karmakānda but also the jñānakānda is only for one with the superimposition of the two bodies. The object of the sāstra is to destroy adhyāsa, but it can be studied and practised only by a person who has identification with the two bodies.

The Ācārya further says that the behaviour of even the person who has mastered Vedānta is not different from that of animals in the matter of worldly dealings26

Though he has acquired discrimination, it is only parokṣa (indirect) and it is obscured during worldly dealings. In deep sleep also there is no difference between a learned man and one who is not learned.

When a cow sees a person coming towards it with a stick it infers that he is coming to attack it and runs away. When a person comes with grass in his hands it infers that the person comes to feed it and goes towards him27 —

यथा हि पशुदमः। शब्दादिपि: श्रोत्रायनं समयं ततः कामात्मिकः प्रतिकूले जाते ततो निर्विदः, अनुकूलेन च प्रवर्तते। यथा पशुकालस घोष्मयोग्यमाश्च यथा जनकोकर्षेक हृदस्थिन्याः, \( \text{प्रतिकूलेन}\) तत्वनिविष्टिः, \( \text{शतनाशन}\) यथा दुःस्थिन्याः, \( \text{प्रतिकूलेन}\) निविष्टिः, \( \text{दुःस्थिन्याः}\) यथा जनकोकर्षेक हृदस्थिन्याः।

Thus the animal uses both direct perception and inference to decide what to do. In other words, it is also a knower (pramātā) because of adhyāsa. Thus there is similarity between even learned persons and animals in the matter of worldly dealings.

Now it may be asked: What has been said is true of worldly dealings. But what about actions performed in accordance with the injunctions of the Vedas? The answer is that adhyāsa of the bodies is necessary for these also. A person performs a yajña for attaining heaven. For this he must know that he has an ātma different from the gross body, because he knows that the gross body cannot go to heaven. But it is not necessary for him to know that the ātma is unattached, free from hunger, thirst, etc. and does not transmigrate, as stated in Vedānta. If he has acquired this knowledge, then he will not do any karma for going to heaven, etc. Moreover, he should identify himself as a Brāhmaṇa for whom alone some of the rituals are prescribed. Thus adhyāsa is necessary for a person to engage in any action including those prescribed in the Vedas. Until a person realizes that he is the pure self, the sāstras are applicable.

It has been established that there is mutual superimposition between the self which is pure consciousness, and the not-self consisting of the body, mind and senses. Such a superimposition is essential for a jīva to become a knower (pramātā). Only if the jīva becomes a pramātā he can experience objects through the sense-organs. Only then he becomes a seer, hearer, thinker, etc. Even for the sāstra to be applicable there has to be superimposition. For performing the rituals laid down in the Vedas for attaining heaven the person should know that there is a self which is different from the gross body and which will continue after death. But he need not know the real nature of the self as described in Vedānta. If he knows the real nature of the self it will be an obstacle to his performing the rituals laid down in the Vedas because there is nothing.
to be attained by such a person. Rituals are laid down based on caste such as Brāhmaṇa, etc., aśrama, age, etc. So a person has to identify himself as a Brāhmaṇa or a grhaṇātha, etc., to perform rituals. All these relate to the body. Such identification is possible only if there is adhyāsa of the body on the self.

Superimposition has been defined in the bhāṣya as the cognition of one thing as some thing else. Nacre is cognized as silver, rope as snake, etc. The consequence of the mutual superimposition of the self and the not-self is that when a person’s wife, son, etc., is happy he is also happy. When they are unhappy he is also unhappy. He thus attributes to himself the joys and sorrows of those near and dear to him. Similarly he attributes to himself the qualities of his gross body such as stoutness, etc., the qualities of his senses such as blindness, deafness, etc., and the qualities of his mind such as thinking, deciding, etc. Wife, son etc., who are external to the body are known as gauna-ātmā. The body, mind and senses are known as mithyā-ātmā.

Here Prakāśārthakāra raises a question and answers it 28. A person sees in himself the joys and sorrows of his wife, son etc. That means that he sees what is somewhere else as present in himself. Does this not amount to anyathākhyāti? The answer is, no. What he sees is not what is somewhere else, such as the good health or illness of some one else. It is another feeling caused by his wife’s or son’s condition. So it is not anyathākhyāti.

Can the attribution of the qualities of the body, mind and senses to the self be said to be anyathākhyāti? Here also the answer is, no. The material cause of the body is not only the five elements but also the nescience relating to the particular jīva. Since nescience is anirvācāniyam, its effect, the body, is also the same. In this view māyā is the totality and individual nescience is a part of it. The body is not something already existing elsewhere but it has come into existence from the individual nescience. So anyathākhyāti is not applicable.

As stated above, the material cause of the body is the five elements together with the nescience of the particular jīva. If we say that the nescience alone is the material cause, then the body should disappear when the nescience ceases, just as the illusory silver ceases to exist when ignorance of the nacre is removed. The body merges in the elements on death.

Now another question arises. Since the nescience which is one of the material causes of the body is still there on death, how can the body merge in the elements? This is answered by taking the analogy of a cloth. When all the threads are removed there will be no cloth though threads, which are the material cause of cloth, still exist. So the effect can cease to exist even if the cause is not destroyed. The effect, cloth, ceases to exist because the conjunction (samoyoga) of the threads, which is one of the causes of the cloth, has ceased to exist.

The qualities of the senses are also superimposed on the self. The senses can function only when the corresponding organ in the body, known as golaka, is in good condition. When the presiding deity withdraws its blessing to the corresponding golaka, the particular sense ceases to function.

The qualities of the mind such as thinking, etc., are also attributed to the self. The entity referred to as 'I' is the blend of the self and the two bodies. The witness of all its acts is the self.

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28 BSSB-MIE- Page 33 - Prakāśārthavivaranam हरसेठकमेधयान्यमन्नांशवद्रूपंनु असुभवतानात्त। आतमविद्या हि साधवादिदेहवत्क्रममितिसविधानात् गियावक्रमेव
विनिषेधमेव दत्त श्रवणम्.
The difference between the body of a living being and a stone is clearly seen. The former is sentient while the latter is inert. The sentiency of the body is because of the superimposition of the self, which is pure consciousness, on the body. There is a difference between this superimposition and the superimposition of silver on nacre. In the latter the silver alone is seen and the nacre is hidden, though it is seen as 'this', that is, as some object in front. But in the case of the superimposition of the self on the body, both the consciousness and the body are seen to be present at the same time. There is mutual adhyāsa in both the cases. In the case of nacre appearing as silver there is mutual superimposition between the object in front which is cognized only as 'this' without the nacre-ness being known, and the silver. This is known as svarūpādhyāsa. In the case of the superimposition of the self on the body, the qualities of the self, namely, existence, luminosity, and being loved (asti, bhātī, priyam) are attributed to the body and so the body appears to exist, to be conscious and to be the object of love. The other two qualities of the body, namely, name and form, belong to māyā. This superimposition of the self on the body is known as samsargādhyāsa, because only the qualities of the self are superimposed.

The existence of superimposition is proved by the theories held by other schools also. The Carvākas consider the body to be the self. This is only because of the superimposition of consciousness on the body. The Buddhists consider the internal organ to be the self. This again means that consciousness is superimposed on the internal organ. The Naiyyāyikas say that what is referred to as 'I' is the self because of the presence of consciousness. Thus mutual superimposition of the self and the not-self is perceived by all. This adhyāsa is also mithyā. It is the cause of the notion that the self is an agent and enjoyer. It is thus the cause of all suffering. It has to be removed along with its cause, avidyā, by knowledge of the self. For removing the obstacles to the rise of self-knowledge three means are laid down. These are hearing, reflection, and meditation.

Hearing is the determination, by the application of the six characteristic signs, that the purport of the entire Vedānta is the non-dual Brahma. The six signs are (1) the beginning and the conclusion, (2) repetition, (3) originality, (4) result, (5) eulogy and (6) demonstration—उपाध्याय: अभावस्य अपूर्वत्न, फल, अर्थवद: उपपत्ति:.

Hearing removes pramāṇa-asambhāvaṇā, or the doubt about the pramāṇa, i.e., the doubt whether the upaniṣadic text which is the pramāṇa purports to teach about Brahma or not.

Reflection is examining what has been heard, by making use of arguments in a constructive manner. Reflection removes the doubt whether Brahma and the jīva are identical or not. This doubt is called prameya-asambhāvaṇā.

Meditation is keeping the mind fixed on the thought of Brahma, uninterrupted by any other thought. Meditation is intended to remove wrong notions such as 'The universe is real'; 'The difference between Brahma and jīva is real', which are contrary to the teachings of the upaniṣads, by concentrating the mind on the self. By this, anātmavāsanā is removed and ātmavāsanā is established. Such wrong notions are known as viparītabhāvanā.

Thus the purpose of hearing, reflection and meditation is the removal of obstacles in the form of doubts and wrong notions that stand in the way of the dawn of Self-knowledge.

For a person who does not have these obstructions mere upadesa of the mahāvāka by the Guru is sufficient. Others will need one or more of these three steps, depending on
the nature and intensity of the obstructions. If self-
knowledge does not come in this birth it will come in a
future birth after the obstructions are removed.

The identity of jiva and Brahman is the subject-matter of
all the upanisads. The purpose of the upanisads is the total
removal of the mutual superimposition of the self and the
not-self along with its cause.

Bibliography and Abbreviations
1. BSSB-MIE- Brahmasūtra Śaṅkarabhāṣya - Mahesh Institute
   Edition with Prakāśārthavivaraṇa, Bhāṣyabhāvaprakāśikā, and
   Nyāyanimāya.
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   Banarsidas Edition with Ratnaprabhā, Bhamati and
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   Series Edition with Bhāmati, Kalpataru and Parimalam.
4. BSSB-MSESE- Brahmasūtra Śaṅkarabhāṣya - Madras Sanskrit
   Education Society Edition with Brahmacidyābharaṇa.
5. PP-MIE- Pañcapadikā- Mahesh Institute Edition with Vivaraṇa,
   Tattvādipana and Rjuvivaraṇa.
6. PYS-BVPE- Patañjali Yogasūtra (Bharati Vidya Prakasan) with
   Tattvaviśārada and Yogavārttikam.

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Self-realization or the direct experience of the identity of
the true nature of the jiva as the Self results from the texts
like "tat tvam asi.". These texts are referred to as maha-vakyas
or great sayings in the sense that they impart us the
knowledge of the partless ultimate, viz. the Self. The second
interpretation of the sūtra, "sāstryonītāt," by Śaṅkara is that
Śastra or scripture is the only pramaṇa or the means of
knowing the Self. We have earlier said that by the word, "
Śastra," it is only the maha-vakyas that are primarily meant,
and other scriptural texts are useful in arriving at the
knowledge of the Self in an indirect way. We shall now
explain the process through which the text, "tat tvam asi,"
gives rise to the knowledge of the Self. The terms, "tat" and
"tvam", primarily signify Isvara who is the bimbata-tviṣṣṭa-
caitanya, and the jiva which is the pratibimbata-tviṣṣṭa-caitanya
respectively. There cannot be any relation of identity between

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